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EFFECT OF FOREIGN DIVORCE UPON DOWER
AND SIMILAR PROPERTY INTERESTS
By FOWLER V. HARPER*
THE CommoN LAW
Before inquiring as to the effect upon dower rights of a foreign
divorce, it is necessary to consider the effect of a local decree. At
the common law the general rule was that a divorce a vinculo terminated all dower rights of the wife in any and all property of the
husband, whether acquired prior to or after the decree.1 The same
rule prevailed as to the husband's estate by curtesy.2 As to such
interests, the parties were in exactly the same position that they
had been prior to the marriage. It was otherwise, however, with
respect to a divorce a mensa et thoro,' unless the decree contained
express provisions affecting or altering such interests. 4
The result was inevitable from a consideration of the nature
of dower' and from its purposes. It was not regarded as a vested
property interest,6 but inchoate only until the death of the husband,
at which time, if coverture continued, it became consummate and
vested.7 It was a mere incident of the marital relation and depended entirely upon coverture. 8 Since the theory was that the
husband during his life was chargeable with his wife's maintenance
and support, his lands were properly chargeable therewith after his
death.9 Accordingly if for any reason the marriage was not "subsisting" at the time of his death, there was no duty to support her
and hence no endowment.' 0 "It would be a strange thing," says
*Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. Coke on Littleton, 32a; Billan v. Hercklebrath, (1864)

Gleeson v. Emerson (1871) 51 N. H. 405.

23 Ind. 71;

2 Wheeler v. Hotchkiss (1834) 10 Conn. 225; Doe v. Brow (1840) 5
Blackf. (Ind.) 309.
3. Clark v. Clark (1843) 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 85; Hokarys v. Hagaban
(1872) 36 Md. 511.

4. Holmes v. Holmes (1848) 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 297.
5.
(6th),
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
decree.

Schoider "Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations"
sec. 1375.
Barbour v. Barbour (1858) 46 Me. 9.
Bishop "Married Women" sec. 239.
2 Bishop "Marriage, Divorce and Separation" sec. 1634.
Ibid., sec. 1632.
If such a duty is to be recognized, provision will be found in the
See Frampton,v. Stephens (1882) L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 164.
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Bishop, "for the law to cast on the lands of the husband, after his
decease, an obligation which did not rest on his person while living.
Therefore it has become established doctrine that in the absence
of a contrary direction from a statute, no woman can have dower
unless she was the wife of the man when he died." ' "
Some few courts have held that where the wife obtains the
divorce for the husband's fault, especially if it be for adultery, she
is not barred from dower in his lands even' in the absence of any
statute preserving dower. The theory seems to be that such a divorce does not affect the marriage relationship so far as the wife's
incidental property rights are concerned, and that the wife under
some circumstances may still be regarded as the "widow" of the
husband within the meaning of the law of dower,' 2 unless she
remarries afterwards and before the death of her first husband."
A more specious rationalization, although equally unsound, may be
based upon the old notion that marriage is a contract. The "contract" affords the wife certain dower rights which will be enforced
unless she, by her own wrong, forfeits them. By procuring a
divorce for her husband's fault, she does not forfeit them and hence
is not barred from her dower.1 4 These cases are, however, distinctly
in the minority and the overwhelming weight of authority made.
dower a mere incident of coverture, and, the status destroyed, the
incident passed with it.
The common law Conflict of Laws rule was entirely orthodox
and applied the general principle that the lex rei sitae controlled the
question of dower.' 5 But when the common law with respect to the
effect of divorce upon dower prevailed, there was no conflict and
the general result would always follow that the divorce barred
dower. No problem of any complexity was presented in the Conflict of Laws under such circumstances. Of course if the foreign
divorce were void and not entitled to recognition in the state of the
situs, there would be no interference with dower,16 but this was because the status of the parties had not been disturbed so far as the
law of the situs was concerned. Under such circumstances a woman
11. Bishop, op. cit., supra, note 8, sec. 1633.
12. See Mansfield v. McIntyre (1857) 10 Ohio 27, 31. See McGill v.
Dening (1887) 44 Ohio St. 645, 652, 11 N. E. 113.
13. See Rice v. Lumley (1840) 10 Ohio. St. 596.
14. See Wait v. Wait (1850) 4 N. Y. 95, 108. A distinction is sometimes made between a divorce which operates upon the marriage ab initio
and one which operates in futuro. In the former case, which is more
properly an annullment, the decree terminates all dower rights, but in the
latter case it does not. See Gum v. Gum (1917) .122 Va. 32, 94 S. E. 177.
15. Minor "Conflict of Laws" p. 174.
16. Goodrich "Conflict of Laws" p. 307.
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might find her dower barred in one state (where the divorce was
procured) but not barred in the other because she was not regarded
as a "widow" in the first state, but was so regarded in the
second. While such a process of reasoning would be clearly
unsound under modern notions of jurisdiction for divorce purposes 7 since if jurisdiction existed the decree is valid evelyvhere
and if wanting it is valid nowhere, including the state which rendered
the decree,'" such a result would still be possible. The full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution does not require the state
of the situs to accord the same effect upon dower rights to a foreign
divorce as it accords to a local decree. But in the absence of a
statute affecting the matter of dower after'divorce, the common law
Conflict of Laws rule would clearly require such uniform effect.
An apparent exception to the above rule is to be found where
the wife procured the void foreign divorce or consented thereto, or
where she accepts the fruits of such a "divorce" by remarrying
afterwards, in which case she would not be permitted to attack the
jurisdiction of the court which rendered the decree and would thus
be barred from asserting her claim to dower by a sort of quasiestoppel. 19
STATUTORY CHANGES IN LoCAL DOWER LAW

Several different types of statutes, each type with numerous
variations, exist in most of the states which in many instances
change the common law rule as to the effect of divorce upon dower
rights.
In a number of states dower has been abolished and a statutory
share in the realty owned by the husband at his' death is substituted
therefor. This is true in California, 20 Colorado,21 Idaho,22 Iowa,23
New Mexico, 24 New York,2 1 Oklahoma,20 South Dakota, 27 Utah, 28
17. See Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, American Law Institute
(hereafter cited 'Restatement") sec. 118.
18. Ibid., sec. 44.
19. See Harper "Validity of Void Divorces" (1930) 79 Pa. L. Rev. 158.
There is a statute on the point in South Carolina. Code of Laws of South

Carolina, 1922, sec. 5243.
20. Civil Code of California, 1923, sec. 173.
21. Courtright's Mill's Ann. Stat., 1927, sec. 7838.
22. Revised Stat., 1919, sec. 4668.
23. Iowa Code, 1927, sec. 11990.
24. New Mexico Stat., Ann., 1929, sec. 68-308.
25. Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New York, ch. 51, secs. 189, 190.
26. Compiled Laws of Oklahoma, 1909, sec. .8986.
27. South Dakota Revised Code, 1919, sec. 702.
28. Utah Compiled Laws Ann., 1907, sec. 2832.
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Washington,2 9 Indiana,30 and Wyoming31 Under a statutory abolition of dower the wife is in the position of a "forced heir" and
her interest in her husband's lands is entirely dependent upon the
status of the parties at the husband's death. A divorce terminating
the marriage entirely cuts off such spouse's interest under such a
statute. It obviously would make no difference if the divorce were
rendered in a foreign state.31a The only question that could be
raised would be as to the validity of the divorce. If it were rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, it would be recognized and
all statutory rights dependent upon the marital status would be
terminated.
In some states statutory provisions make divorce an absolute
bar to dower rights. Thus the Alabama statute provides that "a
divorce from the bonds of matrimony bars the wife of her dower
and of any distributive share in the personal estate of her husband. '32 The Kentucky statute provides that "a divorce from the
bonds of matrimony shall bar all claim of either husband or wife to
the property, real or personal, of the other after his or her decease." 32 A somewhat similar statute exists in Nebraska,3 4 in North
Carolina, 5 and Wisconsin. These statutes, of course, do no more
than re-enact the common law rule. They terminate all interests of
either spouse regardless of the one who was at fault. It is usually
held here also that the effect of a foreign divorce decree would be
identical with that of a domestic decree, 37 although the result would
be the same without the statute.
A substantial number of states have modified the common law
rule by preserving the interests of one or both spouses after divorce under certain circumstances. The statutes vary considerably
in detail and in form. In Ohio the statutes are rather specific. The
statute providing for alimony has the further provision that'at the
death of the husband the wife is entitled to dower in his lands "not
allowed to her as alimony."38 When the divorce is granted because
29. Remington's Compiled Stat. of Washington, 1922, sec. 6897.
30. Bums' Indiana Ann. Stat., 1926, sec. 3377.
31. Wyoming Compiled Stat., 1920, sec. 7002.
31a. Boyles v. Latham (1883) 61 Iowa 174, 16 N. W. 68; Merwin v.
Merwin (1882) 54 Iowa 699, 13 N.'W. 851.
32. Ala. Code, 1928, sec. 7431.
33. Carroll's Kentucky Stat., 1922, sec. 2144.
34. Compiled Statutes of Nebraska, 1922, sec. 1536.
35. North Carolina Code, 1927, sec. 2522.
36. Wisconsin Stat., 1929, sec. 247.36.
37. See Arrington v. Arrington (1889) 102 N. C. 491, 9 S. E. 200;
Hawkins v. Ragsdate (1882) 80 Ky. 353, 44 Am. Rep. 4&3.
38. Throckmorton's Ann. Code of Ohio, 1929, sec. 11991.
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of the husband's aggression the husband is barred of all right of
doiver in her lands 9 but if the divorce is granted for the wife's
aggression her right to dower is ended. 40 Under these provisions the
wife has been held entitled to dower in her first husband's lands even
though she had remarried. 41 Her claim is valid as against a purchaser from him 42 unless her alimony allowance had been made in
lieu of dower.43 In Massachusetts the statute provides that there
shall be no dower after divorce unless the wife procured the divorce
for adultery or confinement of the husband at hard labor in which
cases she is endowed.4 4 The Michigan statute preserves dower to
the wife when she obtains the divorce for adultery, imprisonment
for life or for a term of three years or more, or for his habitual
drunkeness, "in the same manner as if he Were dead."4 5 In all other
cases she is not entitled to dower. The Maine statute also provides
that upon a divorce decreed to the wife for any cause except impotence, she shall be entitled to one-third of his real estate, except
wild lands, "which shall descend to her as if he were dead. ' 4 6 There
is a similar provision in favor of the husband with the addendum
in the
that "in all cases the right title and interesf of the libelee
47
real estate of the libelant shall be barred by the decree."
The statute in Missouri provides that "if any woman be divorced from her husband for the fault or misconduct of said
husband, she shall not thereby lose her dower; but if the husband
4
be divorced for her fault or misconduct she shall not be endowed.1, S
There is a similar statute in Illinois.49 A Rhode Island statute
declares that "whenever a divorce is granted for fault on the part
of the husband, the wife shall have dower as if the husband were
dead; but such dower shall be claimed on proceedings begun within
".."0 Another statute prosix months after the absolute decree ..
vides that "whenever a divorce is granted for fault on the part of
the wife the husband, if he be entitled to curtesy initiate, shall have
a life estate in all the lands of the wife as if the wife were
39. Ibid., sec. 11990.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Ibid., sec. 11993.
McGill v. Deining (1887) 44 Ohio St. 645, 11 N. E. 118.
See Arnold v. Donaldson (1888) 46 Ohio St. 73, 18 N. E. 540.
McKean v. Ferguson (1894) 51 Ohio St. 207, 42 N. E. 254.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Compiled Laws of Michigan, 1915, sec. 11415.
Revised Stat. of Maine, 1916, ch. 65, sec. 9.
Ibid., ch. 65, sec. 10.
Revised Stat. of Missouri, 1919, sec. 327.
Smith-Hurd Ill. Revised Stat., 1927, ch. 41, sec. 14.
Gen. Laws of Rhode Island, 1923, sec. 4216.

44. Gen. Laws of Massachusetts, 1921, ch. 208, sec. 27.
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dead . . . ,,5,Neither spouse has any right or claim in the
realty of the other except as provided in the foregoing statutes. 52
Statutes of the type set out above seem fairly clear and free from
ambiguity. They recognize the rule that at common law a divorce
was a complete bar to a claim for dower or curtesy by either spouse.
The effect of the statute is to extend the right where it were otherwise terminated and in states like Michigan and Maine to have the
further effect of making the dower right consummate upon divorce
"inthe same manner as if the husband were dead."
But there are other statutes which at first glance are not so
clear. In Arkansas a provision makes a divorce for the wife's
misconduct a bar to any subsequent claim for dower. 53 In Hawaii.
a woman divorced for her misconduct "shall not be endowed."54 In
Oklahoma the act declares "a divorce granted at the instance of
one party ...shall be a bar to any claim of the party for whose
fault it was granted, in or to the property of the other except in
cases where actual fraud shall have been committed by or in behalf
of the successful party."55 The Tennessee statute provides that "if
the bonds of matrimony be dissolved at the suit of the husband the
defendant shall not be entitled to dower in the complainant's real
estate.
,. Two New York statutes provide that "in case of a
divorce dissolving the marriage contract for the misconduct of
the wife she shall not be endowed, ' 57 and that "in case of a dissolution of the marriage because of the absence of the wife for five
successive years .-. .she shall not be endowed." 8
The obvious inference from these statutory enactments would
seem to be that, in case of a divorce other than those described in
the statutes, dower would not be barred. This, of course, was not
true at common law. Where there are statutory provisions purporting to create dower, it might be possible to construe the statute
as giving to the wife a vested interest in all lands whereof her husband was seized at any t'me during the marriage. This seems to be
the way the New York courts work it out. The word "widow" in
such statutes is regarded as a description "comprehensively employed" by the legislature to designate the person entitled to dow51. Ibid., sec. 4217.
52. Ibid., sec. 4218.
53. Crawford and Moses' Stat. of Arkansas, 1921, sec. 3521.
54. Hawaii Revised Laws, 1925, sec. 3025.
55. Compiled Laws of Oklahoma, 1909, sec. 6180.
56. Shanon's Code of Tennessee, 1909, sec. 4226.

57. Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New York, 1930, ch. 51, sec. 196.
58. Ibid., ch. 51, sec. 196a.

EFFECT OF FOREIGN DIVORCE ON DOWER

er ;9 but a woman need not be the wife of the deceased at the time
of his death. 0 If the statute declaring that "a widow shall be
endowed with the third part of all lands," etc.,6 ' were construed
alone, such an interpretation would obviously be absurd. Such a
statute in view of the common law would make dower identical with
that which existed before the statute. However, such a statute, when
read in connection with a provision that "in case of a divorce dissolving the marriage contract for the misconduct of the wife she
shall not be endowed," may very plausibly receive the construction
of the New York courts. It is the only way in which the latter
statute can have any meaning whatever. Thus taken together such
enactments may be regarded as preserving to the wife her dower in
every case not covered by the statute which bars such rights. 2 Some
courts, however, have refused to follow this reasoning 2 and apply
the common law rule to all cases of divorce. The statute is thus
64

an anomaly.
59. See Wait v. Wait (1850) 4 N. Y. 95.
60. See People v. Faber (1883) 92 N. Y. 146, 44 Am. Rep. 357.
61. Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New York, ch. 51, sec. 190, prior
to 1929 when the statute was amended to abolish dower and curtesy.
62. Van Blaricum v. Larson (1912) 205 N. Y. 355, 98 N. E. 488.
63. Buckley v. Mosarret (1899) 12 Hawaii 265; Wood v. Wood (1894)
59 Ark. 441, 29 L. R. A. 151.
64. See Reynolds v. Reynolds (1840) 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 193, in which
the legislative history of this provision is detailed: "By the statute. Westm.
II. (13 Edw. I. c. 34), it was enacted that 'if a wife willingly leave her
husband, and go away, and continue with her advoutrer, she shall be barred
forever of action to demand her dower that she ought to have of her husband's lands, if she be convicted thereupon, except that her husband willingly, and without coercion of the church, reconcile her, and suffer her to
dwell with him, in which case she shall be restored to her action.' 2 Co. Inst.
433. This statute was, in substance, re-enacted in this state in 1787 (1
Greenl. St. 294, sec. 7), and it remained in force down to the revision of the
laws in 1830. . . . In 1830 the act of 1787 was repealed, and, after declaring that a widow shall be entitled to dower, a new provision was made in
the following words: 'In case of divorce dissolving the marriage contract
for the misconduct of the wife, she shall not be endowed.' 1 Rev. St. 741,
sec. 8. Under this statute the adultery is not enough. It must be followed
by a divorce dissolving the marriage contract. This has brought us back to
the common law as it stood before the statute of 13 Edw. I., for, as we
have already seen, adultery did not work a forfeiture at the common law.
And as to a divorce a vinculo, that always put an end to the claim of dower:
for, although it was not necessary that the seisin of the husband should continue during the coverture, it was necessary that the marriage should continue until the death of the husband. Co. Litt. 32a; 2 Bl. Comm. 130; 2 Kent,
Comm. p. 52c, and Id. p. 54. The statute bar for the mere act of adultery,
which had existed for more than five centuries and a half, was blotted out
by the repeal of the act of 1787, the British statutes not being in force in
this state; and the eighth section of the act of 1830 has added nothing to
the law as it would have stood had the legislature stopped with a simple
repeal of the act of 1787."
See also for an explanation of the provision, Kendall v. Crenshaw (1915)
116 Ark. 427, 173 S. W. 393; Grober v. Clements (1903) 71 Ark. 565, 76
S. W. 555; and Wood v. Wood (1894) 59 Ark. 441, 27 S. W. 641.
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In some instances statutes provide that certain grounds for
divorce alone Wxill terminate dower,6 5 the most common of which, of
course, are adultery or, as in Virginia, abandonment, 66 and in North
Carolina statutes provide that upon a divorce a mensa et thoro the
party at fault shall lose her dower or his curtesy.6 7 A Minnesota
statute provides for an action to bar dower against one furnishing
grounds for divorce.68
Still another type of statute has been held to bar dower as
well as any other property claim. Such a provision is found in a
Georgia statute to the effect that "after permanent alimony granted
upon the death of the husband, the wife is not entitled to any further
interest in his estate in her right as wife ... ."I" This statute has
been held to be a bar to dower. 70 In Iowa the code provides that
"when a divorce is decreed the guilty party forfeits all rights
acquired by marriage." 7' 1 This statute has been interpreted, to cover
property rights,7 2 although the question of dower could not arise
since such estates are abolished in Iowa. It has been held, however,
that the statute does not refer to dower or to the statutory
substitute, since the implicafion would be that the innocent party's
rights would be preserved. This, it was held, was not the case. The
common law prevails and both parties are barred.7 3 In Nevada,
where the community rule prevails, a statute declares that "all
property not otherwise disposed of by the decree is vested in the
party Who procures the divorce." 7' But in New Mexico, where
dower is abolished and the community is in effect, there is a provision that "failure to divide the property on divorce shall not
affect the property rights of either husband or wife. ' 7 5 Prior to
this statute a divorce decree in that state was res judicata as to all
rights which might have been adjudicated in the divorce proceedings.76 A Kansas statute provides that the wife is barred of all
77
rights in the husband's property not disposed of by the decree.
65. Public Laws of New Hampshire, 1922, ch. 306, sec. 19.
66. Virginia Code of 1930, sec. 5123.
67.. North Carolina Code, 1927, sec. 2523, 2524. See Joyner v. Joyner
(1909) 151 N. C. 181, 65 S. E. 896.
68. Mason's Minnesota Stat., 1927, sec. 8622.
69. General Code, 1926, sec. 2991.
70. Harris v. Davis (1902) 115 Ga. 950, 42 S. E. 266; Stewart v.
Stewart (1871) 43 Ga. 294.
71. Iowa Code, 1927, sec. 10483.
72. Holdorf v. Holdorf (1924) 198 Iowa 158, 197 N. W. 910.
73. Hamelton v. McNeill (1911) 150 Iowa 470, 129 N. W. 480.
74. Compiled Laws of Nevada, 1900, sec. 505.
75. New Mexico Stat. Ann., 1929, ch. 8, sec. 509.
76. Duncan v. Beacon (1914) 18 N. M. 579, 139 Pac. 140.
77. Kan. Revised Stat., 1923, ch. 60, sec. 1511.
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This, it would seem, would effectually bar a claim to dower after a
divorce. But another provision declares that "a divorce shall be a
bar to any claim of the party for whose fault it was granted in or
to the property of the other," except in case of fraud.78 It would
seem that dower after divorce would be effectually barred by such
an enactment as that in Louisiana: "the divorce shall forever dissolve the bonds of matrimony between the parties and place them
in the same situation with respect to each other as if no marriage
had ever been contracted between them. '7 9 Similarly as to the
Porto Rico statute: "A divorce carries with it a complete dissolution
of all matrimonial ties and the division of all property and effects
between the parties to the marriage."8 10 The same result might be
expected from a simple statute like the Utah provision that "when
a divorce is decreed the guilty party forfeits all rights acquired by
marriage," 8' or tle Arizona enactment that "any separate property
not disposed of by the decree shall remain separate property free
82
from the claims of the other.
To be sharply distinguished from all the statute-, above, which
make the divorce decree operative by its own force to affect the
dower rights of the spous~s, is a totally different type of enactment.
This class of statute prescribes a rule of practice for the courts and
empowers them to make certain orders and to enter certain provisions
in the divorce decree to affect the property rights of the parties. The
statutes are purely jurisdictional ones and authorize the provisions
named, which the court otherwise would not have power to make
by reason of the fact that in divorce matters it acts as a court of
special and limited jurisdiction. 3 These statutes appear in a variety
of forms in different states. Some of them authorize a disposition
of the community, 4 others empower the court to divide the separate
property of the husband or the wife or their joint property. Sometimes these statutes prescribe directions of a general nature to guide
the court in making its decree. The Delaware statute for example
provides that when the wife gets the decree the court must restore
all her realty and such share of the husband's realty as appears right.
But if the husband gets the decree the court may restore her separate
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Ibid., ch. 60, Sec. 1512.
Wolf's Constitution and Revised Laws of Louisiana, 1904, sec. 1195.
Porto Rico compilation of Revised Stat. and Codes, 1913, sec. 3243.
Utah 1907 Compiled Laws Ann., sec. 1213.
Arizona Revised Code, 1928, sec. 2182.
See Bislop "Marriage, Divorce and Separation" ch. IX.
California Civil Code, sec. 146; Idaho Revised Stat., 1919, sec. 4650.
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property to the wife and such share of the husband's property as
may be reasonable.85
A common type of statute of this general class is that which
empowers the court to make such order in relation to the property
87
of the parties as shall be "right,"88 or as shall be "just,"
or as

may be "expedient." 88 Sometimes the statutes limit the circumstances under which the court may award such share of the one
spouse's property to the other as may be "just." 89 Under these
statutes courts are usually regarded as having authority to divest
the property rights of one party and create property rights in the
other.9 0 Sometimes the statute specifically provides that the filing
of the decree alone shall effectuate a record binding upon all the
world."- Again some statutes classed as "alimony" statutes are
regarded as authority for the court to adjust the property interests92
of the parties although other "alimony" statutes permit nothing but
a money decree against the defendant.9 3
The statute of the District of Columbia empowers the court
expressly to preserve dower in its decree.94 The Michigan statute
makes it the duty of the court to include in the decree a provision in
lieu of dower in favor of the wife. 5 In Arkansas a statute provides
that a wife is "entitled" as of right to a provision in a decree procured by her for one-third of her husband's lands for life.99 A
similar statute in Oregon entitles the successful party to a divorce
decree to an undivided one-third of the realty of the other. 97 Such
statutes do not themselves operate automatically to transfer title
to land on divorced 8 but merely authorize the court to make such a
85. Revised Code of Delaware, 1915, sec. 3018.

86. Iowa Code, 1927, sec. 10481.
87. Public Laws of New Hampshire, 1922, ch. 287, sec. 16; General

Laws of Vermont, 1917, sec. 3590, 3593; Pierce's Code of Washington, 1905,
4637; Wyoming Compiled Stat., 1920, sec. 5000.

88. Virginia Code, 1930, sec. 5111; West Virginia Code, Ann., 1906,
sec. 2927.
89. As to divorce obtained on certain grounds, General Laws of Vermont, see. 3593 (where husband obtains divorce for wife's adultery, court
may award him such share in the wife's reality or, personality as it deems
"just").

90. Unless there is a provision to the contrary, as in Texas.
plete Texas Stat., 1928, sec. 4638.
91.

92.
68 N.
93.
(1894)
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Wisconsin Stat., 1929, sec. 247, 26.

Corn-

North Carolina Code, 1927, sec. 1665. See Davis v. Davis (1873)
C. 180; Oklahoma Compiled Laws, 1909, sec. 6179.
Burn's Indiana Stat., 1926, sec. 1110. See Alexander v. Alexander
140 Ind. 560, 40 N. E. 55.
D. C. 1924 Ann. Code, p. 144, A 71.
Compiled Michigan Laws, 1915, sec. 11436.
Crawford and Mose's Stat. of Arkansas, sec. 3511.
Olson's Oregon Laws, 1920, sec. 511.
See Bamnford v. Bamford (1870) 4 Ore. 30.
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decree. The decree, however, operates directly upon the res and
divests the title of the one party and vests it in the other.9
CONFLICT OF LAWS UNDER STATUTORY CHANGES
The starting point for all Conflict of Laws problems is the
fundamental proposition that the lex rei sitae governs the dower of
the wife in a particular piece of land. This is because such state is
the only state which has jurisdiction (power) in the international
sense to determine what interest will be created by a given act or
status in land within its borders. That law determines the effect of
divorce on dower regardless of whether divorce is domestic or
foreign.
In c6nsidering the effect of a foreign divorct under modern
statutes, mention should first be made of express Conflict of Laws
statutes. Kansas for example, has a statute which provides that a
foreign divorce "shall have the same force with regard to persons
now or hereafter resident or hereafter to become resident of the state
as if said judgment had been rendered by a court of this state and
shall as to the status of all persons be treated and considered and
given force the same as a judgment of the courts of this state."'
This statute applies to "persons" and to "status"; it says nothing
about property rights. In the absence of a decision on the point, it is
to be supposed that it would require the same results of a foreign
divorce upon local property rights as if the decree were a domestic
one. In South Carolina, where there is no provision whatever for
local divorce, a statute expressly provides that one who procures
a divorce in any other state shall be barred of dower. ° The legislative policy against divorce in that state is to be found in another
provision which "estops" the wife to claim dower even where the
foreign divorce is not recognized as valid in South Carolina. 1 2 An
Indiana statute provides that "a divorce decree in any other state,
by a court having jurisdiction thereof, shall have full effect in this
state." 0 This statute has been held to prevent a wife, after a foreign divorce, from asserting any claim to the husband's property
at his death, 04 although the same result would have been required
99. See Senkler v. Berry (1908) 52 Ore. 215, 96 Pac. 1070.

100. Kansas Revised Stat., 1923, ch. 60, sec. 1518.
101. Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1922, sec. 5237. See Dawson v.
Dela Torre (1921) 116 S.C. 338, 108 S.E. 101; Shirley v. Parris (1922)
121 S.C. 260, 113 S.E. 788.
102. Ibid., 5243.
103. Burn's Indiana Stat., 1926, sec. 1121.
104. Hilbis2 v. Hattie (1896) 145 Ind 59, 44 N. E. 20.
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without the statute, since the common law rule prevails in Indiana
as to a wife's interest in her husband's lands after divorce. 10 5 The
Indiana cases also hold that a local decree of divorce constitutes an
adjudication of all property rights between the parties,0 0 although
such an effect would not necessarily be accorded to foreign divorces.
In the absence of a Conflict of Laws statute at the situs of the
land, the application of the general dogma of lex rei sitae in connection with the local property law, sometimes presents a serious
problem. Statutes of the foreign state, where the decree was rendered preserving dower under the circumstances of the decree, are
0 7
of no effect if there is no statute preserving dower at the situs,
or, if the foreign court in its decree includes a provision preserving
dower under a local statute authorizing the same, it is of no effect
if the statute at the situs bars dower.' 08 The principal problem in
this type of case is properly to interpret the local statute to determine
(1) whether it affects the property interests of the parties ipso facto
upon the rendition of a divorce decree, and (2) whether it is intended to apply equally to foreign decrees. The latter is the more
difficult question and one upon which there is some confusion in
the cases. It is always a question for the courts of the state which
enacts the statute. "Whether a statute of one state securing or
denying the right of dower in case of divorce extends to a divorce
in a court of another state having jurisdiction of the cause and of
the parties depends very much upon the terms of the statute and
upon its interpretation by the courts of the state by the legislature
of which it is passed and in which the land is situated."'' x0
The principle involved in the interpretation of these statutes
seems to be a penetration of the legislative policy which prompted
the statute. Starting with the common law proposition that every
divorce from the bonds terminates all dower rights, it is clear that
the legislature desired to preserve these rights under certain circumstances, these circumstances depending primarily upon moral
considerations. The common type of statute preserving dower to
the innocent party in all or certain cases requires some attention to
what is included as "innocence" in the policy established. From a
legal point of view innocence means a failure to afford grounds for
divorce; accordingly the spouse who has not afforded grounds for
divorce is to be protected as against the spouse who has afforded
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Chenowith v. Chenowith (1859) 14 Ind. 2.
Murray v. Murray (1899) 153 Ind. 14, 53 N. E. 946.
Block v. P. & G.Realty Co. (1924) 96 N. J. Eq. 159, 124 Atl. 372.
McLaughlin v. McLauqhlin (1918) 202 Ala. 16, 79 So. 354.
-Barrett v. Failing (1884) 111 U. S. 523, 526. 28 L. Ed. 505.
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such grounds. But the legislative policy is further particularized in
each state by statutes exclusively prescribing what are "grounds"
to support a divorce decree. Consequently it may be plausibly
argued that statutes preserving dower against the party at fault
are to be interpreted narrowly to include only such fault or grounds
as are prescribed by the local legislature and which have been
judicially determined in a particular case by the local courts. Under
such a construction the statute would apply only to domestic divorces.
A second possible construction would be to regard the statute
as applicable to all divorces, domestic or foreign, granted for
"aggression," "fault," or "misconduct" as recognized by local divorce law. This enforces the local notion of the moral grounds
which are sufficient to support protection for the "innocent" spouse
but does not confine the determination of such grounds in a particular case to local courts.
A third construction is to be found in the view that a judicial
determination by the courts of any state of the "fault," "aggression,"
or "misconduct" of one of the spouses according to the legal definition of those terms by the proper law applicable to the status of the
parties at the time is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
statute. This construction proceeds partly from the view that moral
policies of the various common law jurisdictions are not so dissimilar as to justify a difference in the results of divorce decrees
from the several jurisdictions, and partly from a recognition of the
great social interest involved in certainty and uniformity of the
legal consequences ensuing from a valid divorce. While the courts
have frequently seized upon other arguments and frequently upon
misconceptions of the legal principles involved, including fanciful
doctrines of the Conflict of Laws, it seems clear that the correct
solution of the question depends upon a choice between the foregoing hypotheses based upon a consideration of the principles of social
utility implied therein.
The cases under the Ohio statutes disclose an interesting treatment of the problem. In McGill v. Deming-10 the wife had obtained
a decree in California where the parties had both been domiciled
at the time. It was held that she was entitled to dower in his Ohio
lands under the statute preserving dower to the wife if the decree
was granted for the "aggression" of the husband. The ratio decidendi seemed somiewhat as follows: (1) it was assumed that
110. (1887) 44 Ohio St. 645, 11 N. E. 118.
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"aggression" in the local statute meant such a cause as would be
grounds for divorce in Ohio. This was present in the California
divorce; (2) the Ohio statute changing the common law rule that
divorce invariably barred dower and preserving dower to the wife
where the divorce was granted for the aggression of the husband
was found to be applicable to a foreign divorce; (3) there was no
violation of the "territorial" principle of the Conflict of Laws involved in such a construction of the local statutes. Said the court:
"While it is a principle of general recognition that real or immovable property ought to be left to be adjudged by the law of the place
where the property is situated, as not within the rule of extraterritorial
law, it is not inconsistent with this principle to accord to a foreign
divorce the same effect upon real property located beyond the forum of
the decree that is given to divorce of the same class decreed within
the jurisdiction where such property is situated."
After quoting from Story on "Conflict of Laws" (sec. 230 e)
the court continued,
"and so .

. . if a right of dower according to such local law would

accrue upon the granting of a divorce by a local tribunal, the like
effect would follow a foreign divorce of the same sort decreed by a
competent tribunal. The foreign divorce would not be recognized as
exerting an extraterritorial force, propiori vigore, but would owe its
effect rather to its conformity to the law of the place where the real
property might be situated."
In' Mansfield v. McIntyre,"' where the husband had secured
a divorce in Kentucky, the court had occasion to construe differently
the statutory provision that if a husband obtained a divorce for the
aggression of the wife, her dower was barred. It was held that
"aggression" meant grounds for divorce under the Ohio law decreed
by Ohio courts. It might have been held that since the Kentucky
decree did not disclose the grounds upon which the divorce had
been granted, it was not established that the statute operated to bar
her rights. There is no presumption, in the absence of proof, that
a divorce was for the "fault" of the wife so as to bar dower under
* ?*atute. 1 12 Since the other statutes preserve her dower except
where the decree was granted for the wife's aggression, she was
entitled to her dower. But these intelligible grounds seem wanting
in Doerr v. Forsythe, 3 a later case. Here the husband had procured
a divorce in Indiana, upon substituted service. The reasoning in the
opinion proceeded as follows:
111. (1840) 10 Ohio 27.
112. Murry v. Scully (1914) 259 Mo. 57, 167 S. W. 1017.

113.

(1893) 50 Ohio St. 726, 35 N. E. 1055.
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"The decree of divorce granted the husband in the state of Indiana
acted only on the marital relation between the parties and did not
affect nor purport to affect the property rights of the wife in the state
of Ohio. For aught that appears, the divorce may have been granted
on some ground not recognized as a ground for divorce by the laws
of this state; so that it cannot be said that it was granted for any
aggression of hers within the meaning of sec. 5700 Rev. Stat. But if it
were otherwise, as she had no opportunity to defend, all that can be
claimed for the decree is that it dissolved the marriage relation between
the parties, and restored the husband to the status of an unmarried
man. This the court could do; but, as it has no jurisdiction of the
person of the wife, it was not competent to the Indiana court to affect
such rights as she had acquired in the property of the husband under
the laws of this state."
This opinion seems to amount to a statement of propositions
of law somewhat as follows: (1) the Indiana decree did not
purport to affect the wife's dower; (2) the Ohio statutes preserve
dower except where a divorce is granted for the wife's aggression;
(3) "aggression" means grounds for divorce under the Ohio statute;
(4) the Indiana court had no jurisdiction to deprive the wife of
any property interest in her husband's lands in Ohio; (5) to deny
the wife's claim for dower would be to accord such an effect to the
Indiana decree. The second and third propositions are correct and
will account for the decision when applied to the facts." 4 The first
proposition is no doubt correct in the case in hand, but irrelevant.
Proposition four is, of course, likewise sound since the wife was
n6t personally before the court, but irrelevant. The fifth proposition
is false. If the foreign court had no jurisdiction to divorce the
parties, the decree is, of course, void and the status and property
rights incident thereto unchanged in Ohio and everywhere else.
If the wife were actually at fault, the husband could acquire a
domicile in Indiana or any place else and obtain a valid divorce
upon substituted service, entitled to recognition under the Constitution in every state in the Union."" The effect of the altered status
upon the wife's dower in Ohio is a distinct and different problem.
It is a problem of Ohio law for Ohio courts and it involves no question of the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal to affect directly Ohio
land or the wife's interest in the land. It would make no difference
whether the wife were before the Indiana court or not, although
this seems to be a paramount consideration in the opinion of the
114. The grounds for the Indiana divorce were not put in evidence.
115. See Restatement of Conflict of Laws (tentative draft) by the

American Law Institute, sec. 118.
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case."' In either event, the Ohio laW could provide certain legal
consequences in Ohio; does the Ohio law bar her dower under the
circumstances, or does it preserve it? The court answered the
question, but it went further and introduced much irrelevant and
unsound Conflict of Laws doctrine in addition.
The Missouri court arrived at a different conclusion in a
similar situation where the husband had obtained a foreign divorce."3 It*was recognized that the foreign decree could have no
extra-territorial effect but the Missouri statute preserved dower to
the wife only when a decree was obtained for the husband's fault.
In all other cases the common law rule prevailed. The decree in
question, not falling within the statutory exception, was effectual
to terminate her property interests in his Missouri lands.
The Missouri case is commonly regarded as in conflict with the
Ohio case of Doerrv. Forsythe. But under the respective statutes of
the two states such is not true. The Ohio statutes are construed as
preserving the wife's dower whenever the divorce is not obtained
for her "aggression." 8 The Missouri statute preserves her dower
only when the divorce is obtained for her husband's misconduct."'
Thus the common law rule in Ohio is abrogated in all cases save
the statutory exception. In Missouri the common law rule is abrogated only in the cases designated by the statute. It is to be noted
that the Missouri case turned upon the section of the statute which
provided that "if the husband be divorced from the wife for her
fault or misconduct she shall not be endowed." The court held that
"this section applied to all divorces wherever obtained in this or any
other state and whether obtained on personal service or by order of
publication." The same result would have followed had the statute
not been construed to apply to foreign decrees. With no statute applicable, the common law would have governed the case, thus cutting
off the wife's dower. The court seemed to recognize this in the
opinion.
In the Kentucky case of Hawkins v. Ragsdale120 the court
apparently lost sight of the common law rule. The husband here
had obtained a divorce in Indiana upon constructive notice. It was
held that the wife's dower in Kentucky lands was barred under the
local statute. The court, however, seemed to believe that dower
116. See Gould v. Crow (1874) 57 Mo. 200. See Goodrich "Conflict of

Laws" p. 307.

117.
118.
119.
120.

Gould v. Crow, supra, note 116.
See note 38, supra.
See note 48, supra.
(1882)1 80 Ky. 353, 44 Am. Rep. 483.
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would be intact were it not for the construction thus put upon the
statute.
"Hawkins being a bona fida citizen of Indiana and resident therein
at the time of the proceedings in which the divorce was obtained, the
decree severing the bonds of matrimony determine the status of the
parties, but does not by its own force affect the right to property in this
state. Section 14 Article 4, Chapter 52 of the General Statutes
provides that a divorce bars all claim to curtesy or dover.
"We are of the opinion that this statute was intended to apply to
all valid divorces no matter of what sovereignty granted. In its terms
it is general referring to the fact of the severance of the bonds of
matrimony, and not to the tribunal by which the dissolution is declared."
It is to be observed that the result should have been the same in
2
this case, without any statute whatever1 1
The remaining cases which show the general trend of statutory
construction may be briefly reviewed. In Thomas v. King 22 the
wife was barred from her dower in Tennessee lands of her husband
who had obtained an Illinois divorce both by the common law and
2
under the local statute. In Hilbish v. Hattie3
the husband divorced
the wife in another state and she was thereby barred from any interest in his Indiana lands. Indiana has no dower, but has a statutory
substitute therefore and while the court purported to ground its
result upon the local Conflict of Laws statute,1 24 it is again clear
that the only question involved was to determine the validity of the
foreign divorce. If it was valid, the wife's interest in Indiana lands
is immediately barred without the force of the statute. Van Blaricur v. Larson2'
and Van Cleaf v. Burns 28 are two leading New
York cases in point. In the former, the wife, who had procured a
divorce in a foreign state, did not lose her dower in New York by
reason of the local statute preserving dower except where a decree
is rendered for her fault. In the Burns case where the husband had'
procured the foreign decree, the wife was not barred because the
decree had not been granted for the wife's fault within the meaning
of the New York statute, adultery only being ground for divorce
in that state. A Massachusetts defendant in Barber v. Root 2 7 held
title under execution against a husband from whom the wife had
121. Hood v. Hood (1872) 110 Mass. 463.
122. (1895) 95 Tenn. 60, 31 S. W. 983.
123. (1896) 145 Ind. 59, 44 N. E. 20.
124. See note 103, supra.
125. (1912) 205 N. Y. 355, 98 N. E. 488.
126. (1890) 118 N. Y. 549, 23 N. E. 881.
127. (1813) 10 Mass. 260.
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obtained a Vermont divorce. It was held that the husband's interest
in the wife's property was terminated as a result of the decree. An
Ohio divorce obtained by the wife barred her from dower in her
28
husband's Kansas lands in Chapman v. Chapwnan.1
The Maine court, in Harding v. Allen,120 construed a local
statute to the effect that if a wife obtains a divorce for her husband's
adultery, dower in his lands is not barred. The wife had been
deserted in Massachusetts where the couple had been domiciled. She
thereafter established her separate domicile in Rhode Island and
obtained a divorce there for adultery. Later she remarried. It was
held that she had not lost dower. "The language [of the statute]' 3 0
is general," argued the court, "and is not limited to divorces within
31
the state." The New York court in Sullivan v. Sullivan"
construed
the statute preserving dower after divorce in favor of a woman who
had procured a foreign decree although she had twice violated a
prohibition upon her remarriage contained in a decree procured by
her first husband. The Supreme Court had refused to allow her
dower on the clean hands doctrine. 32 The Appellate Division found
that this maxim had nothing to do with her property interests in her
husband's lands in view" of the statute.
In Illinois homestead rights in the lands of a husband who had
33
procured a divorce in Kansas were denied under the local statute.
But in an Oklahoma case,' where the husband had abandoned his
wife in Oklahoma and procured a divorce in Missouri on substituted
service, the decree was regarded as having no effect upon the wife's
homestead rights in Oklahoma, under a statute somewhat different
from the one involved in the Illinois case. 35 The Iowa case of
128. (1892) 48 Kan. 636, 29 Pac. 1071.
129. (1832) 9 Me. 140, 23 Am. Dec. 549.
130. See note 46, supra.
131. (1923) 205 N. Y. Supp. 955.
132. Sullivan v. Sullivan (1923) 203 N. Y. Supp. 140.
133. Rendleman v. Rendlenan (1886) 118 Ill.
257, 8 N. E. 773. See also
Gummison v. Johnson (1921) 149 Minn. 329, 183 N. W. 515 (similar holding
as to husband's homestead rights in wife's realty).
134. Gooch v. Gooch (1913) 38 Okla. 300, 133 Pac. 242. But the husband had abandoned his family and obtained the foreign divorce. Under such
circumstances, the divorce was invalid and the decision could well have
rested on these grounds. See Restatement, sec. 118.
135. The Illinois statute was as follows: "If any husband or wife is
divorced for the fault or misconduct of the other, except where the marriage
was void from the beginning, he or she shall not thereby lose dower nor the
benefit of any such jointure, but if such divorce shall be for his or her own
fault or misconduct, such dower or jointure and any estate granted by the
laws of this state in the real or personal estate of the other shall be forfeited." See Rendleman v. Rendleman (1886) 118 Ill. 257, 263.
The Oklahoma statute was as follows: "A divorce granted at the instance of one party . . . shall be a bar to any claim of. the party for
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lloldorf v. Holdorf"3 presents a confused order of reasoning on
much the same kind of question. The husband had left his wife in
Iowa (whether for her fault or not does not seem clear) and procured a Colorado divorce. The wife claimed certain property in
Iowa as exempt from his creditors under the statutory grounds of
abandonment. The court held that the Iowa statute by which the
guilty party to a divorce suit forfeits all claims to the property of
the other applied to foreign divorces. It also seemed to hold that
the Colorado decree estopped the wife from setting up abandonment
by the husband although she had not appeared in the action. Since
under the modern view a deserting husband could not acquire such
a Colorado domicile as to confer jurisdiction upon the state to
di(Torce him, 1 7 it would seem that if properly presented to the
court, the wife could set up the fact, if it existed, of her abandonment by the husband.
Some of the cases involving the wife's right to dower after
a foreign divorce merely turn on the validity of the foreign decree
with no local property statute involved in the situation. Here the
only problem is to determine whether the foreign state had jurisdiction to render the decree.
In Colvin v. Reed 3 ' a husband acquired an Iowa domicile
under circumstances which did not amount to desertion on his part.
It was held that his Iowa divorce did not bar the wife's dower in
Pennsylvania. There was no local statute but the court thought that
since Pennsylvania was the matrimonial domicile of the parties, that
state had the "greater" right to regulate the wife's status. The case
is not within the decision of Haddock v. Haddock 9 and is clearly
erroneous. In Reel v. Elder 40 where the husband deserted his wife
in Pennsylvania, the matrimonial domicile of the parties, and procured a divorce in Tennessee, it was held that the wife was not
barred from dower in his Pennsylvania lands as the Tennessee divorce was invalid. This case is correct as Tennessee had no jurisdiction to divorce under the modern view. In McCreary v. Davis'4'
the wife procured a divorce for her husband's fault, in another
whose fault it was granted in or to the property of the other except in
cases where actual fraud shall have been committed by or in behalf of the
successful party." See Compiled Laws, 1909, sec. 6180.
could account for the decision.
136. (1924) 198 Iowa 158, 197 N. W. 910.
137. Restatement sec. 118.
138. (1867) 55 Pa. St. 375.
139. (1906) 201 U. S. 562, 50 L. Ed. 867.
140.

(1869)

141.

(1895) 44 S.C. 195, 22 S.E. 178.

62 Pa. St. 308.

The last clause
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state. It was held that her dower in South Carolina was not barred,
apparently because the court thought it unnecessary to recognize a
foreign divorce, in view of the policy of the state. It is new settled
that such a decree, if valid, must be recognized under the Constitution. A different result is now available under the South Carolina
Conflict of Laws statute.

142

THE EFFECT OF PROCEDURAL OR DIRECTORY STATUTES

With respect to the type of statute of which a number are set
out above, wbich eihpower or direct the court to dispose of the
property rights of the parties in the decree, or to insert a provision
in lieu of dower, etc., it is clear that such statutes are of no effect
unless such a provision is included by the proper court in the decree when the divorce is granted. Thus where a wife obtained a
divorce in a foreign state, she could not bring an action in Nevada
for a division of the community there under a local statute au1 43
thorizing the "court granting the decree" to make such a division.
A similar result was obtained in an Idaho case,1 4 4 although in that
case it seemed clear that the wife had deserted her husband and
taken up a residence in Oregon where the divorce had been obtained. Under such circumstances, of course, Oregon had no jurisdiction to divorce her. Similarily in Barrett v. Fielding4 5 an Oregon statute making it the duty for the court to decree to the successful party to a divorce action a one-third interest in the other's
property did not affect property rights after a foreign divorce.
An Arkansas case resulted in a similar decision under the same type
of statute. 46
On the other hand, where the court granting the decree exercises authority under such a statute, it operates only upon property within the state and does not affect land in a foreign jurisdiction. Accordingly where a wife procured a divorce in Illinois,
the court reserving to her dower in her husband's lands, it had no
effect as to Alabama property. 47 Conversely where an Oregon
decree barred the wife of all rights in the husband's lands in Okla142. See notes 101, 102, supra.

143. Keenan v. Keenan (1917) 40 Nev. 351, 164 Pac. 351.
144. Bedal v- Sake (1904) 10 Idaho 270, 77 Pac. 638.

145.

(1884) 111 U. S. 523, 28 L. Ed. 505.

146. Gwyn v. Rush (1920) 143 Ark. 4, 219 S. W. 339.
147. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin (1918) 202 Ala. 16, 79 So. 354. So also
in Pinkley v. Pinkley (1913) -155 Ky. 203, 159 S. W. 795, where a California
decree of division of property was of no effect in Kentucky, where a local
statute prescribed a different division. See Procter v. Procter (1905) 215
I1. 275, 74 N. E. 145, 106 Am. St. Rep. 168.
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homa, it was of no effect.14s The court granting the decree of
divorce should recognize that a local statute does not, and could
14
not, afford authority to dispose of foreign lands.
50
A recent South Carolina case (Scheper v. Scheper ) seems
to confuse the above principles in an effort to support a contrary
result. A wife had procured a limited divorce in North Carolina
where a statute made such a decree in favor of either husband or
51
The
wife a bar to dower or curtesy of the party at fault.
husband moved to Georgia and there remarried. It was held that
he was not entitled to share in his first wife's South Carolina property. The court became hopelessly entangled in attempting to
rationalize its decision. It reasoned:
"Reading the express statutory provisions referred to into the
judgment of the North Carolina court, we have a clear-cut judicial
determination of the forfeiture for cause of the husband's marital
rights in his wife's property-a forfeiture subject to be defeated only
and resumption of cohabitation" [citing a
by the wife's condonation
z
North Carolina case]15 a

Again, the court said:
"But in so far as that judgment determined and fixed the marital
status and rights of the husband with respect to the wife's separate
property, it would clearly appear to be such a judgment as would be
binding and conclusive in that state.

.

.

.

Since, however, a state

cannot through its courts extend its coercive power to, nor effect by
judicial determination, property outside of its own territory, it may be
conceded that the judgment of the North Carolina court could have
no direct operation upon real property in this state and could not per se
affect the legal or equitable title thereto, and hence that it is not
entitled to recognition and enforcement under the full faith and credit
clause of the federal Constitution [citing cases]. But, under the law
of comity, as the judicial determination of a competent court of a
sister state, whereby the marital status of a husband was denatured of
its efficacy to give rise to or support a legal right in the wife's separate
property, we see no reason why that judgment should not be given the
same force and effect in this jurisdiction as in the state of its rendition."
148. Sharp v. Sharp (1916) 65 Okla. 76, 166 Pac. 175, L. R. A. 1917F
562. So also in Taylor v. Taylor (1923) 192 Cal. 71, 218 Pac. 756, 51 A. L.
R. 1074; Rodgers v. Rodgers, (1896) 56 Kan. 483, 43 Pac. 779, as to home-

stead rights in foreign lands.
149. Baird v. Baird (1920) 98 Ore. 169, 188 Fac. 699; Procterv. Procter

note 147, supra.
150. (1923) 125 S. C. 89, 118 S. E. 178.

151. See note 67, supra.
151a. Taylor v. Taylor (1893) 112 N. C. 134. 16 S. E. 1019.
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The court thereupon seemed to shift its position and regarded
the North Carolina decree as operating upon the person of the
husband to bar his right to claim a share in his wife's property:
"The North Carolina judgment may fairly be construed as having
established a personal obligation on the part of the husband to renounce and convey to the wife any expectant marital interest in the
wife's separate property wherever situated. Such a personal obligation
to renounce could have been lawfully undertaken by contract either
in North Carolina or in this state and its performance enforced in
either jurisdiction."
After such obviously erroneous reasoning, the court seemed
to stumble on a sound ratio decidendi by assuming that the husband
had obtained a divorce before his remarriage in Georgia, 152 which
divorce, though doubtless void,' 5 ' would estop him from denying the
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it, 154 and thus he would be
barred under the South Carolina statute'5 5 or the common law
quasi-estoppel rule.
One more phase of the general problem deserves passing comment, viz., the effect of an order by the foreign court in granting
the divorce compelling one of the parties to convey land in another
state. If a procedural statute at the state where the decree is rendered will not operate to affect land in another state, what effect
will an order of the court directing the owner to transfer such
land have? Obviously, the order can have no more direct effect
upon the foreign land than the statute does. But what action will
the court where the land is situated be induced to take when the
question is subsequently raised between the parties to the divorce
action or their privies? Without entering into an extended discussion of the principles involved, which have been elaborately analyzed
elsewhere, 15e it is believed that the court at the situs of the land
will be induced to regard the question as conclusively adjudicated
and that it will decree a conveyance of the land to the party entitled thereto under the foreign decree, as a matter of right and
152. Cf. Murray v. Scully (1914) 259 Mo. 57, 167 S. W. 1017.
153. Because the husband could not acquire such a domicile in Georgia
as would confer jurisdiction upon that state to divorce him. He was living
there, apart from his wife by his own fault as judicially determined by the
North Carolina decree of limited divorce. Consequently the Georgia decree
was void. See Restatement, sec. 118.
154. See note 19, supra.
155. See note 101, supra.
156. See Barbour "The Extraterritorial Effect of the Equitable Decree"
(1919) 17 Mich. Law Rev. 527; Cook "The Powers of Courts of Equity"
(1915) 15 Col. Law Rev. 37, 106, 228.
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irrespective of the "discretion" of the court at the situs. 15 7 The
question cannot be regarded as settled.
WAIVER,

ELECTION AND ESTOPPEL UNDER PROCEDURAL STATUTES

While the rule that the law at the situs of the land determines
the interest of a divorced spouse therein, it may be that statutes
at the forum of the divorce decree may induce the court at the situs
to deprive a divorced spouse of dower when otherwise it would not
be barred. Statutes like that in Rhode Island' 58 afford such possibilities, and White v. Warren5 9 presents such a result. The wife
had obtained a divorce in Rhode Island for her husband's adultery.
Under the statute there she w.as entitled to dower in his lands as
if the husband were dead, providing she brought an action within
six months after the divorce and unless a claim for alimony be

made within such period. Such a claim was made and alimony
allowed. It might be supposed that such a statute would affect
the wife's dower only in Rhode Island land. It was held, however,
that the claim made by the wife, in view of the statute, operated as
an election to the alimony in lieu of dower and constituted a waiver,
binding upon her everywhere. Rhode Island had no jurisdiction,
of course, to deprive a wife of dower in Massachusetts land. It
did have power to prescribe conditions which, when brought into
operation by the voluntary act of the wife, would be personally
binding upon her. It is to be remembered that in granting alimony
under such circumstances the Rhode Island court takes into consideration the property owned by the husband in foreign states.
Consequently, it would be unfair for the wife to be permitted to
485.

157. The Restatement does not adopt this view. See Restatement, sec

158. The statute involved is as follows:

(4216) Sec, 5. "WhenevEr a

divorce is granted for fault on the part of the husband, the wife shall have

dower as if the husband were dead; but such dower shall be claimed on

proceedings begun within six months after the absolute decree, and, if not
claimed within said period, or if claim be made for alimony within said
period, then dower shall be deemed to be waived and released, and the only
relief of the wife shall be a claim for alimony chargeable upon the estate
of the husband, or some specific portion thereof, as the court may decree
(but any such decree whether entered before or after April nineteen, nineteen hundred seventeen, ordering payment of alimony in any fixed sum or
sums either indefinitely or for a certain period may for sufficient cause at
any time be altered, amended, and annulled by said court, after notice to the
parties interested therein) : Provided, that in case of such divorce between
parties married before the digest of eighteen hundred and forty-four went
into operation, the wife shall be reinstated in all of her real estate and have
restored to her all of her personal estate not, in either case, disposed of at
the date of the filing of the petition for said divorce." P. L., 1917, ch. 1532.
159. (1913) 214 Mass. 204, 110 N. E. 1103.
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enforce a dower claim in those states after having taken advantage
of the Rhode Island statute by an alimony decree.
If such a question as the one presented in White v. Warren,
supra, were presented in Ohio, there would be an additional reason
for the same result, viz., the Ohio statute preserving dower to an
innocent wife in lands "not allowed to her as alimony." 160 If a
court granting a divorce should include in the decree, pursuant to a
statute like the one in Michigan,' 61 a prGcision in lieu of dower,
or where the statute on alimony is construed as conferring upon
the court power to make an order for alimony which is conclusive
as to the parties' interests in the other's property, 16 2 what will be the
effect in a foreign state where realty is situated and where the dower
right would ordinarily be preserved? There seems to be no case
directly in point, but a situation so closely analogous has arisen
that the decision may be regarded as decisive of the present problem. The case in point is Bates v. Bodie"63 There had been an
Arkansas divorce and a decree and award of alimony, both parties,
of course, appearing. The wife was prohibited from presenting
a further claim for alimony in Nebraska out of the husband's lands
there. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the full
faith and credit clause interposed an insuperable difficulty and
required an estoppel of record against the wife in such an action.
The result seems fair when it is presumed that the Arkansas court
took into consideration the Nebraska lands and that the award was
made "in full of all demands."
The opinion in the Bodie case is not very clear cut, but the
soundest rationalization seems to be that the wife's appearance in an
action in which the alimony award made was in substance in lieu
of all claims, constituted a waiver of any claim for further maintenance out of foreign property and such election is personally
binding upon her everywhere. It would seem pretty clear that her
acceptance of property or money "in lieu of dower" or as a final
adjudication of property interests under circumstances which would
bring into consideration the value of 'all her husband's property
wherever situated would constitute a similar waiver or election and,
under the federal Constitution, be an effective estoppel of record
in every sister state.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See note, 38, supra.
See note 95, supra.
As the Indiana statute. See note 106, supra.
(1916) 245 U. S. 520, 62 L. Ed. 444.

EFFECT OF FOREIGN DIVORCE ON DOWER
SUMMARY

The propositions of law developed in the foregoing discussion
may be summarized as follows:
(1) At the common law any divorce a vinculo terminated
dower and courtesy.
(2) It made no difference whether the divorce were local
or foreign. The law was the same in all common law jurisdictions.
(3) As to statutes preserving dower to the innocent party
after divorce, only such a statute at the situs of the land will be
effective. Whether it applies to a foreign divorce, and if so, to
what foreign divorces depends upon its interpretation by the courts
of the state. Such statutes have been interpreted in all of the
following three ways, depending upon the courts notion of the
policy of the legislature:
(a) To apply only to domestic decrees; "fault" or "misconduct" or "aggression" means such as are grounds for divorce in the local state when judicially found by local courts.
(b) To apply to foreign decrees when granted for grounds
for divorce recognized by local law.
(c) To apply to all foreign decrees.
(4) Statutes authorizing or directing a court to divide property in a certain way or purporting to "entitle" one spouse to certain
property of the other are not applicable to foreign decrees nor
can they empower a court to divide foreign land.
(5)
Provisions of a foreign decree, pursuant to a statute,
ordering the one or the other spouse to convey property to the
other, will be recognized by a court at the situs as conclusive between the parties as to which one is entitled to specific land in
question, although the foreign decree alone will have no direct
effect upon the title to the land nor will it be a lien upon the land.
One who takes with notice of the provision of the foreign decree
will be subject to the equities of the spouse in whose favor the
foreign decree runs. The full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution does not require this result, but the common
law Conflict of Laws rule does require it.
(6) Where both parties appear before the court and a divorce
and award of alimony is made under a statute which makes such
a claim and award of alimony a waiver of dower, or where the
alimony statute provides for a decree "in lieu of dower," or where
any other type of statute is involved which terminates the spouses'
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interests in each other's property and authorizes the court to take
into account all property owned by the parties, wherever situated,
such a claim and award of alimony will be effective to bar a subsequent claim for dower in any other state, regardless of the statutes
in the state where the land is situated.
(7) The result, in all such cases as those last mentioned,
would seem to be required by the full faith and credit clause of the
federal Constitution.

